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1The Virtues of Mundane Science
By Daniel M. Kammen and Michael R. Dove
Published in Environment, Vol. 39 No. 6 (July/August 1997)
I had when a Youth read and smiled at Pliny’s Account of a Practice…to still the waves by pouring oil into the sea…
The learned, too, are apt to slight too much the Knowledge of the Vulgar.
- Benjamin Franklin1
   Sustainable resource management has become the most hotly debated and challenging concept in
environmental research and development policy. Based largely on a notion defined by the Brundtland
Commission2 a decade ago, calls for attention to sustainability have become de rigueur in the academic,
conservation, and international development communities. Discussion of the issues involved have led
to general agreement on four key points: policy action is often required in the face of uncertainty and
prior to attaining a full scientific consensus; environmental policy must confront and address the
political economy of resource exploitation; current economic theory provides an inadequate foundation
for the validation and management of many ecosystems and natural resources; and interdisciplinary
research is fundamental to understanding sustainability.3 As it happens, one of the most important
contributions made by the work to date has been to encourage coordination and collaboration across
disciplines.4 Nonetheless, one key element seems to be missing from the discussions about sustainable
resource management: the scope those discussions ought to have. Unless that scope is broadened to
include pressing but often overlooked problems – what one may call “the mundane” – research on
sustainability and the policies conducive to it will continue to have only limited impact.
    Academic definitions of “cutting edge” research topics exclude many of the issues that affect the
largest number of people and have the greatest impact on the environment; everyday life is rarely the
subject of research. For example, while new and emerging “high profile” diseases pose important
challenges to medical science and public health, very different illnesses take the greatest overall toll on
poor communities in developing nations. In central Kenya, for example, the overwhelming majority of
medical cases reported – respiratory infections; skin, eye, and ear ailments; diarrhea; and urinary tract
infections – stem largely from such commonplace factors as indoor air pollution from cooking fires and
a lack of potable water and adequate food (see Table 1 on page 3).5  Globally, acute respiratory
infections, malnutrition, diarrhea, malaria, and measles account for a dramatic (if unexciting from a
research standpoint) 71 percent of the 12.2 million deaths of children less than 5 years old. Finding
solutions to these problems does not require less sophisticated research or environmental management,
yet support for work on these mundane topics is weak relative to their importance to humans and the
environment.6
2Bias Against the Mundane
   The prejudice against research on mundane
topics has created a conceptual cordon
sanitaire within many disciplines. In energy
and development research, it appears as a
disproportionate focus on advanced
combustion systems, commercial fuels, and
large centralized power facilities, even
though more than 3 billion people rely on
wood, charcoal, and other biomass fuels for
the bulk of their energy needs.7 In the
agricultural sciences, it appears as an
emphasis on genetic manipulation of crop
varieties and idealized test-plot trials, in
contrast to the relatively few on-farm
studies of simpler technologies that reflect
the actual constraints on subsistence and
small-scale farmers.8 In development and resource economics, it manifests itself in the focus on
products traded in formal markets as opposed to those produced and consumed locally.9 In development
policy, it is seen in the emphasis on multibillion dollar institutional loans as opposed to support for
small-scale, local-level credit ventures like Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank, whose approach has proved
very successful but which initially met with stiff resistance from the World Bank. In the humanities and
social sciences, the cordon sanitaire shows up in the focus on “primitive,” exotic, and distant societies
as opposed to more proximate communities that combine often disparate populations in less tidy social,
economic, and political networks.10 Even in ecology, which has made important strides in practical
conservation-oriented research, the prejudice is reflected in the preponderance of studies of “virgin” or
climax forests as opposed to the complex successional mosaics associated with human influences.11
These everyday topics are not wholly neglected, of course, but the attention they receive is small in
relation to the critical role they play in determining whether particular resource-management practices
are sustainable or not12.
   This article argues that the major obstacles to developing sound environmental practices are not
principally technological (although expanding our research efforts in that area is critically important).
Instead, the primary stumbling block is the lack of integrative approaches to complex systems and
problems. A mundane example—efforts to improve wood- and charcoal-burning
cookstoves—illustrates the important advances that are possible from integrating scientific,
engineering, and social science research with very practical implementation programs. The article then
discusses five broad misconceptions and prejudices that have impeded research on sustainable
development. It concludes with a set of policy recommendations intended to generate debate and move
In Kenya and in other developing countries, the vast majority of health problems
stem from “mndane” factors such as poor sanitation and indoor air pollution.
3mundane science from a peripheral to a central position in approaches to environmental and social
sustainability.
Cookstoves for the Poor
   The history of efforts to
improve cookstoves provides
an excellent case study of the
role mundane science could
p l a y  i n  p r o m o t i n g
sustainable development.
Though often lost to view,
the use of biomass fuels is
one of the most important
issues on this area. Such
fuels comprise 40 to 60
percent of total energy
consumption, both industrial
and domestic, in many developing nations. Household cooking alone accounts for more than 60 percent
of total energy use in sub-Saharan Africa (exceeding 80 percent in several countries). Further, some
poor families spend 20 percent or more of their disposable income on wood and charcoal or devote
upwards of 25 percent of their household labor to collecting wood.13 Inefficient combustion of these
traditional fuels results in high concentrations of pollutants that cause acute respiratory infections.
These infections, in turn, are the most pervasive cause of chronic illness in developing nations and the
culprit in an estimated 4.3 million deaths per year.14
   Efforts to improve cookstove efficiency and reduce pollution (along with making the stoves
inexpensive and easy to use) have a long and at times tortured history.15 Many of the classic problems
with development efforts—the overemphasis on technology in isolation, the inapplicability of
laboratory trials conducted under ideal conditions, and insensitivity to gender and household
dynamics—were encountered in cookstove design and dissemination programs. Progress has been
made, however, by integrating the efforts of engineers, ecologists, sociologists, economists,
government agencies, members of professional development organizations, and non-governmental and
community groups. (For details, see the box on page 4) Stove programs have led to the dissemination
of more than 120 million stoves in China (reaching a remarkable 60 to 70 percent of all households),
several million stoves each in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, and hundreds of thousands in a number
of African nations, including almost 1 million in Kenya, where more than 50 percent of urban
households and 10 percent of all households, use improved stoves.16 But steady and sufficient funding
for such projects has been difficult to obtain: Fewer than 200 projects have been undertaken during the
last decade, most with budgets of only thousands or tens of thousands of dollars.17
Table 1. Most Common Diseases, Laikipia District, Kenya, 1993
Disease Cases Repor Percentage Proximate cause(s)
Respiratory infections 80,562 33.8 Cooking fires, smoking
Malaria 35,986 15.1 Living in marginal environments
Skin Diseases 19,959 8.4 Cooking fires, poor sanitation
Accidents 9,450 4.0
Diarrheal Diseases 9,035 3.8 Poor sanitation
Urinary Tract Infections 8,655 3.6 Lack of basic medicine
Intestinal worms 8,204 3.4 Poor sanitation, poor food storage
Rheumatism 7,776 3.3
Eye infections 6,831 2.9 Cooking fires
Ear infections 6,433 2.7 Cooking fires, lack of basic medicine
Other diseases 45,390 19.0
Total 238,281 100.0
SOURCE: Unpublished data compiled by the Laikipia regional office of the Kenyan Ministry of Health
4       Funding constraints not withstanding, cookstove programs have been the focus of or impetus
behind a remarkable array of scientific, economic, environmental, and methodological advances.
Beyond the direct impacts on fuel use, indoor air pollution, and household economics, the detailed
household analysis necessary to evaluate impacts and design optimal adoption strategies have
contributed to innovations in participatory rural appraisal techniques and gender-sensitive and open-
ended interviewing, as well as to new theories of networking, communication, and the diffusion of
innovations.18 Designing and disseminating better cookstoves has stimulated new work on low
IMPROVING COOKSTOVES
Worldwide, nearly 3 billion people cook their meals over open fires or on simple metal canisters that utilize biomass fuels such as
wood, charcoal, dung, and crop residues.1 In terms of energy use, these cooking systems are very inefficient, often delivering as little
as 10 to 20 percent of the potential heat to the cooking pots. As a result, people in rural areas spend an inordinate amount of time
gathering fuel, and forests and soils are suffering from excessive removal of combustible materials. Traditional cooking practices are
also highly polluting, creating serious health problems in developing countries.
    Since the 1970’s, international aid organizations have been promoting the development of cleaner, more efficient cookstoves for the
developing world, and a few hundred individual projects are now under way in more than 50 countries.2 Although recent efforts have
been reasonably successful, the process was by no means as simple and straightforward as originally anticipated. Professionals from a
number of fields have had to overcome significant technical and social problems to design, produce, and disseminate cookstoves
suitable for a variety of local conditions.
    From an engineering standpoint, the new stoves had to meet four requirements: to maximize fuel combustion by maintaining a high
temperature and an adequate supply of oxygen; to maximize radiative heat transfer to the pots by keeping them close to the flames; to
maximize convection by circulating as much of the hot gases over the pots as possible; and to maximize conduction by adding
insulation. In addition, to be readily accepted by the public, the stoves had to be inexpensive, easy to use, and adapted to local fuels,
foods, and cooking methods.3
    The development of the jiko stove in Kenya illustrates the difficulties inherent in meeting such diverse requirements. The jiko is a
charcoal burning metal stove shaped like an hourglass, the upper portion of which has a ceramic insulating liner. It costs roughly $2
(U.S.), uses 1,300 pounds less fuel per year, and saves urban households as much as $65 per year (one-fifth the average annual income
in Kenyan cities). The initial designs had serious flaws, however: The stoves were unstable, burned too hot, and their openings did not
match the size of most cooking pots. In addition, they were too expensive for the rural households to whom they were primarily being
marketed.
    These problems were ultimately solved through a combination of additional technical research, consultations with local
craftspeople and potential users, and the development of less expensive, wood-burning versions for rural households. Some of the
   
_____________________
1. For a more extensive account of cooking practices and stove development, see D. M. Kammen, “Cookstoves for the Developing World,” Scientific
American, July 1995, 64; and D. F. Barnes, K. Openshaw, and R. van der Plas, What Makes People Cook with Improved Biomass Stoves?, Technical
Paper No. 242, Energy Series (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1994).
2. Barnes et al., note 1 above, pages 39-44.
3. S. R. Connors, “Wood-Conserving Cookstoves,” unpublished paper.
4. H. Krugman, Review of Issues and Research Relating to Improved Cookstoves, IDRC-MR152e (Ottowa, Canada: International Development
Research Centre, 1987).
earliest designs were done not by engineers but by aid workers with little technical background and the
mistaken belief that appropriate technology was simple technology.4 As it turned out, an extensive
research program was necessary to determine the physics underlying such “simple” stoves, and even then
the final design required much trial and error. Suggestions from users have been critical to developing a
more efficient, commercially viable model capable of performing well in the home as well as in the
laboratory.
   Today, hundreds of local craftspeople manufacture some 20,000 stoves per month, and more than 1
million are in use throughout Kenya. Variants of the jiko are also finding their way into other African
countries, and a diverse array of stove development efforts is under way in Asia and Latin America as
well.
A jiko cookstove
5temperature combustion and materials science and provided pointers for technology dissemination
efforts in a variety of fields.19 Stove programs also contributed to the surprising discovery that indoor
environments are the most important source of human exposure to pollutants in the rural area of many
developing nations.20 (These programs were part of a concerted effort to explore previously neglected
small-scale or diffuse sources of trace-gas emissions, including rice paddies and the production of
charcoal by pyrolysis—all of which turned out to be globally insignificant.21) This is a remarkably large
amount of research to stem from a mundane topic and a modest investment.
    Mundane science programs such as those involved in cookstove research, development,
dissemination, and analysis are rare but not unique. The development of oral rehydration therapy
(ORT) for cholera and other diarrheal diseases involved a similar mix of laboratory work on the
linkages between glucose and electrolyte transport in the small intestine and field studies on the
misconceptions in treatment strategies.22 Like cookstove research, “the history of ORT reveals an
extraordinarily long path to discovery followed by an ongoing struggle for legitimacy and
implementation… and [illuminates] the conflicts between ‘high’ and ‘low’ technology.”23Another
example, that of “mundane economics,” is described at the end of the article in the box on Grameen
banking.
Five Fallacies
    As the quotation from Benjamin Franklin at the beginning of this article attests, lack of attention to
mundane science is a long-standing problem. It shows up in contemporary research generally, and in
environmental science and resource sustainability work in particular, in the form of five key fallacies:
Mundane science is antiscientific in spirit; the greatest overall returns come from basic rather than
applied research; at best, mundane science is simply an application distinct from (and potentially in
conflict with) basic research; mundane science is subjective, while basic science is objective; and
mundane science has more to do with society than science.
     The first fallacy is that an emphasis on mundane science amounts to a rejection of scientific and
technological progress. In reality, the dichotomy between science and mundane problems has more
often been due to mainstream scientists’ lack of interest in such problems than to attacks from the
“fringe”. A good example of this is the “appropriate technology” (AT) movement spearheaded by E.F.
Schumacher, which focuses on the design and practical implementation of inexpensive windmills,
latrines, bicycles, and other tools of everyday life, particularly to help the poor.24 Academics and
development planners pursued AT in the years following the OPEC oil embargoes, but it later dropped
out of the international development mainstream despite its great relevance and cost-effectiveness.
Instead of emerging as a research and policy ally of development planners, AT necessarily evolved into
an opposition movement.25
     The perception that efforts to broaden the mainstream view amount to a rejection of science is belied
by such examples as the “peasant science” movement in the Philippines called MASIPAG. This
alliance of farmers has rejected the packages of rice varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, and directed
6development offered by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) because these packages give
them too little control over the management, quality, and timing of their yields. Instead, MASIPAG
farmers, in collaboration with researchers
from the University of the Philippines in
Los Baños, have adapted modern methods
of crop hybridization to develop rice
varieties that meet their own criteria for
cost, yield, disease resistance, soil impact,
and taste.26 In other words, MASIPAG
farmers have employed IRRI’s own
technology to meet local needs and
development concerns not satisfactorily
addressed by IRRI. This example shows
that rejecting particular scientific
programs, which are embedded in
particular economic and political contexts,
is not a rejection of science per se.
      The second fallacy assumes that science is a zero-sum game where investment in anything but
traditional basic research reduces the chance of breakthrough discoveries. This view is based more on a
culture of entitlement than on scientific reality, however. Greater applicability of scientific research has
historically not only generated new hypotheses and research directions but has also increased financial
and political support for research in general. The popularity of (and financial support for) most
scientific fields is tied to their periods of practical importance. Examples include petrology and geology
(following the demonstration of accurate methods for locating subterranean natural resource deposits),
nuclear physics (following the Manhattan Project), and molecular biology and computer science
(following the commercialization of applications in both of these fields).27
       The third fallacy–the perceived tension
between basic and applied research–is partly
a product of post-World War II research and
development policy formulated by Vannevar
Bush, director of the U.S. government’s
wartime Office of Scientific Research and
Development.28 Bush constructed his famous
blueprint for postwar science policy around
the ideas that “basic research…is the
pacemaker of technological progress” and
“applied research invariably drives out
pure.”29 In part because of this formulation,
basic research has flourished over the past
Researchers often fail to understand the sophistication of traditional practices such
as this Pakistani villager’s use of different biomass fuels for different purposes.
Worldwide, more than 3 billion people cook over open fires or highly inefficient
and polluting stoves.
750 years while applied research has lagged behind: The (basic-to-applied) funding ratio in the federal
budget has increased from 1:3 50 years ago to 1:1 today.30 This reallocation of funds has contributed to
the pervasive distinction between esoteric science and mundane implementation. Development work
generally, and that on sustainable development in particular, is now done primarily by professional
practitioners and consultants with the support of a relatively small and fragmented research corps.31
       The fourth fallacy is that development outcomes (both successes and failures) are essentially
technological rather than sociological in nature. For example, even though development efforts in the
Third World have generally failed to assist the poor and protect the environment, development analysts
persist in seeing these outcomes as accidental or the result of noncompliant subjects. Critics argue that
development fails to attain its explicit ends because it usually benefits a favored few (by opening new
avenues for state control of natural resources and extending the reach of government bureaucrats and
multinational corporations) rather than the majority.32 Another problem is that rural development and
modernization commonly undermine local resource management institutions before new ones are ready
to replace them. This creates a window of misopportunity during which time enormous resource
degradation can occur.33 Examples include the gold rush in the Amazon that led to forest destruction,
massive mercury poisoning of rivers, and epidemics of new diseases among indigenous residents.34
Because such consequences are unintended, however, they are generally perceived as accidental rather
than systemic; as a result, they receive little attention.
      There is a related tendency among mainstream analysts to treat the development process as
apolitical. Although the international development community presents “development” as a universal
good, there are winners and losers in virtually every intervention.3 5  The normative nature of the
development enterprise inhibits the
feedback that would reveal this.
Much of the research and writing
done by the development
community, for example, appears
only as a “gray” literature of internal
project reports, which are not
subjected to scrutiny and debate in
peer-reviewed journals. This
practice contributes to the view that
topics pertaining to sustainable
development lie beyond (or beneath)
the proper scope of science.
      One such topic is the ad hoc adaptations of local communities to their changing physical and social
environments. Javanese rice farmers, for instance, routinely mix different pesticides together to lower
costs and raise potency–a practice that is not only not part of the prescribed technological regimen but
actually violates government regulations.36 Because the farmers are not supposed to be doing this,
however, development researchers have not devoted much time to studying this practice.
As part of the “peasant science” movement, rice farmers in the Philippines have adapted
modern hybridization methods to develop their own varieties.
8      The fifth fallacy is that the mundane aspects of development have more to do with society than with
science. For example, the vast majority of the research related to the Green Revolution has focused on
food production rather than storage and postharvest distribution because the former is considered part
of science while the latter is not–even though as much as 40 percent of some harvests is lost to
spoilage, corruption, and inadequate infrastructure.37 This preference for research on plant hybridization
and molecular biology instead of the mundane issues of food storage, equity, and security epitomizes
the technical-fix approach to science and development. Even more important, it suggests why the line
between science and nonscience has been drawn where it has: Mundane questions often threaten the
status quo, while esoteric issues do not. The most threatening questions of all, of course, are why this is
the case and what can be done about it.
Lifting the Veil
        The case of cookstoves is representative of a number of initiatives in mundane science, including
the design of delivery systems for oral rehydration therapy, participatory methods of rural resource
accounting and management, and microloans for the poor.38 The challenge is to legitimize and expand
this philosophy and the type of work to which it leads.
      There are a number of ways to give such initiatives a larger role in research and policy decisions.39
These include giving much more support to academic-industry and academic-practitioner partnerships;
extending academic boundaries to encompass the entire range of human-environment interactions;
breaking down the often antagonistic division between development professionals and academia;
instituting a more open review process for development publications, projects, and institutions;
removing the barrier between development planners and the intended beneficiaries or local
populations;40 and addressing the frequently counterproductive tension between pure and applied
research. The primary obstacles to implementing these proposals are cultural and institutional, not
scientific. Expanding our commitment to mundane science requires that we overcome a Catch-22,
however: Mundane issues generate little interest until a crisis emerges, at which point a solution is
expected at once because the problem appears to be so simple. Unless we overcome the bias against
mundane science, we will be wedded to shortsighted, partial solutions to emerging issues in
development and the environment. Serious research requires a commitment to sustained periods of
training, preparation, and support, which mundane science rarely receives. A valuable principle to use
in the design and evaluation of sustainable development initiatives is that of use-inspired basic
research, which–however basic the science involved–has a clear focus on applications.41 The robust
output of Benjamin Franklin himself–spanning the fields of architecture, fluid dynamics, physics,
shipbuilding, navigation, and weather forecasting–is testament to the benefits of combining mundane
and theoretical research.
9MUNDANE ECONOMICS: GRAMEEN BANKING
    An illuminating example of the application of mundane science to sustainable development is provided by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh,
which pioneered the extension of small amounts of credit to the poor.1 The bank was the brain child of Muhammad Yunus, a professor of economics
in Bangladesh. Yunus began by reversing the traditional relationship between the poor and large lending institutions: Instead of asking how to make
the poor more creditworthy, he asked how banks could be more responsive to their needs. Whereas the assumption in so-called poverty alleviation
programs was (and often still is) that the poor cannot be trusted with money, Yunus assumed that they could and that society was at fault for not
making this possible. At  the heart of the Grameen Bank’s solution to the problem is the “lending circle,” typically a group of five women who jointly
manage and guarantee their loans. Through these circles, the bank first educates borrowers about money management and small-scale economic
development and then makes small loans to them, usually no more than $20 (U.S.) per household the first time. When the borrowers have repaid these
loans, they become eligible for larger and larger ones, culminating in housing loans of several hundred dollars. In all cases, however, borrowers
proceed at a pace determined by their own capacity, not the needs of the lender. The combination of the Grameen Bank’s trust in people, its education
program, and its reliance on lending circles has resulted in a phenomenally high 98 percent loan repayment rate, which exceeds the rate received by
commercial banks even in developed countries (to say nothing of that of multilateral development banks). Indeed, the Grameen Bank’s approach to
alleviating poverty has been one of the most successful in contemporary development history. Whereas the bank began with loans of no more than
$50 each to some 20 families, it now operates in one-half of Bangladesh’s 30,000 villages, making loans of more than $400 million annually.
Furthermore, the bank’s approach has been emulated in many other developing (as well as some developed) countries.
    Grameen’s basic strategy is now being extended beyond banking, providing a new model for development. Yunus and his colleagues are planning
to adapt the concept of collective resource management to meet a variety of needs, including giving the poor access to modern telecommunications
technology (e.g., cellular phones and the Internet) and providing solar and wind energy infrastructure to isolated or neglected communities.2 Such
projects, of course, are met with skepticism–just as the Grameen Bank’s lending policies initially were. Indeed, the traditional banks in Bangladesh
have never stopped doubting Grameen’s viability. Over time, however, their doubts have  become increasingly irrelevant.
     Grameen’s expansion of the market for sophisticated technology among the poor will make it even easier for them to obtain such technology.
Historically, every time sales of photocells, cellular phones, windmills, laptops, and so forth have doubled, unit process have fallen roughly 20
percent.3 Grameen has opened the door to these and other technologies and services among the poor, which, combined with improved access to credit,
will spur locally controlled (as opposed to aid-driven) development and (ideally) local commercial activities.
    The Grameen approach, of course, is not without its problems. Ironically, some of them stem from its very success and the tremendous interest it
has generated. In recent years, there has been a flurry of popular articles, academic studies, and development reports on the Grameen approach,
culminating in a Microcredit Summit in Washington D.C., in February 1997, which set a goal of “expanding microcredit to 100 million of the world’s
poorest families.”4 This ambitious goal will require a huge expansion in human capital. As the Summit Declaration noted,
[f]ield experience has shown that one field worker can serve 200 borrowers. Assuming this staff-client ratio, 500,000 field workers will be needed in
order to serve 100 million clients. If one assumes a dropout rate during training of 15 percent, the total number of intakes of trainee field workers
should be 575,000.5
    While the Grameen Bank’s achievements show that village-level organizing on this scale is possible,6 they also suggest that not just any
organization can accomplish it. The Grameen Bank grew slowly over a period of 20 years, and a number of the original borrowers are now top
managers. Now, however, the bank is attracting attention–and funding–from the world bank, large commercial banks, and U.S., Japanese, and
European aid agencies. Their desire to inject hundreds of millions of dollars into small-scale lending may come without the patient, two decade build-
up of human capacity, educational programs, and local accountability that have characterized Grameen’s lending. Too often, conventional loans come
with demands for instant returns and sound-bite successes, a constraint that precludes the careful learning so essential to Grameen’s success. In fact,
the potential for trouble is not confined to the big lenders, as the declaration of the Microcredit Summit makes clear:
It is important to recognize that many NGO’s will need to dramatically change their approaches, capabilities, and systems if they are to be successful
in microcredit. Microcredit needs to be approached as a socially responsible business, not as charity or social welfare. It is difficult to incorporate a
successful microcredit program into an institution that has a relief, social service, or paternalistic approach or helping the poor.7
    If properly implemented, however, the Grameen concept could serve as a basis for community development in which many of the recent advances
in technology and participatory planning come together. This simple–and classically mundane–concept, adapted and developed through a humble and
applied process, offers fresh insight into–as well as a theoretical challenge to–much of traditional development economics.
________________________
1. Current information on microcredit activities and the Grameen Bank may be found at http://webwrite.com/partners-bsbdc/micrnews.htm.
2. Ibid.
3. L. Argote and D. Epple, “Learning Curves in Manufacturing,” Science 247 (23 February 1990): 920.
4. See the Microcredit Summit Declaration and Action Plan at http://www.igc.apc.org/results/Declaration.htm, preamble, paragraph 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
